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1 Introduction
This article focuses on foreign agricultural
investment (FAI) contracts and analyses whether
they have the potential to contribute to
alleviating problems of unemployment and
underemployment, particularly of young people
in sub-Saharan Africa. It considers foreign
agricultural investments as projects which are
promoted by local politicians and executed by
foreign investors and as a tool to promote local
development. This, through the potential of
these investments to increase agricultural
productivity, provides the prospect of generating
new jobs and creating an attractive environment
for local young people to take part in investment
projects. Despite the large number of reports by
the media and journal articles in various
disciplines, detailed coverage is limited (see
Palmer (2011) for a literature review of large-
scale investments, and academic contributions
from Cotula (2008, 2010, 2011); Cotula et al.
(2009, 2004); The Oakland Institute (2010,
2011a, 2011b); Deininger et al. (2011); Arezki et
al. (2011); and Anseeuw et al. (2012)).
In researching this article, I1 have collected and
analysed information from 80 investment
contracts. Using the contracts as the main source
of information provided a balance for the stories
promoted by the media, which tend to associate
FAI contracts with imminent human rights
violations and disruption of local structures
through ‘land grabs’. In structuring the
methodology, I have applied rational choice and
legal theory. I sought to understand whether
rational actors would design the contracts as they
have been drawn up, and whether the perceptions
of the media are well founded.
The article is structured as follows: first I
summarise the most relevant aspects of the
labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa and the
introduction of large-scale investment in
agriculture, using information from 80
investment contracts. I then apply public choice
theory to understand why politicians behave as
they do. These approaches are compared with the
‘contractual reality’, with the finding that it is not
possible, at least in the short term, for such
contracts to fulfil their promise of creating new
jobs for local populations. It means that affecting
foreign investments in agriculture as a policy to
stimulate the local job market, and including
large numbers of young people as a vulnerable
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social group, can work only if investors behave
altruistically; an assumption which is rejected by
the public choice approach. The last section
concludes the analysis and provides
considerations for future policy design.
2 Labour market situation in sub-Saharan Africa
The precarious situation of sub-Saharan African
labour markets has been repeatedly highlighted
in reports of international bodies, most
significantly the International Labour
Organization (ILO 2010, 2012) and the World
Bank (Deininger et al. 2011). Although most
countries in the region experienced
improvements to 2008, two major factors have
affected the regional labour market since then:
the financial and food crises. These do not
appear to have affected unemployment directly
as the unemployment rate in sub-Saharan Africa
has been stable since 2005 at 11.5 per cent (ILO
2012). Nonetheless, these factors have increased
the number of persons whose jobs are highly
vulnerable, affecting primarily young people,
who represent around 30 per cent of sub-Saharan
Africa’s population. ILO (ibid.) highlights the
correlation between crisis and vulnerability with
many households obliged to sell their assets and
borrow money, increasing their vulnerability to
further shocks. Young people are further
impacted by generational problems which
directly or indirectly result in the transfer of land
(White, this IDS Bulletin).
While sub-Saharan Africa showed considerable
economic growth during the 2000s, there has
been no improvement in labour market
performance with 62.4 per cent of workers
remaining poor (ILO 2012). The level of
vulnerable jobs is at 76.6 per cent (ibid.). In sub-
Saharan Africa the quality of employment is a
more important issue than quantity: the ILO
(2012) states that the unemployment rate in the
region has decreased significantly; in some
countries it is under 5 per cent. However, the fact
that the working-age population grew on average
2.8 per cent during the 2000s puts strong
pressure on youth labour markets, particularly in
an environment in which decent work
opportunities are in short supply (ibid.). ILO
highlights that this tendency reduces the
opportunities of young people in both rural and
urban areas due to rapid demographical change
which is out of step with changes in the labour
market. This explains the high working poverty
rates for youth in comparison with adults (ibid.).
One of the most affected sectors is agriculture,
of prime importance for most developing country
economies. Thus, the necessity of encouraging
young people to engage in national policy
processes has been recognised at both national
and international levels, notably through the
African Youth Charter, which became binding
international law in 2012. However, local social
structures tend to be dominated by particular
groups or social classes which limit the
possibilities of creating incentives for young
people to participate in decision-making
processes and to be part of the productive sector
of their local communities (te Lintelo, this IDS
Bulletin).
According to the World Bank, around 65 per cent
of the rural population in most of the least
developed countries (LDCs) is directly employed
in agriculture while much of the rest of the
population depends indirectly on the agricultural
economy. The agricultural labour force accounts
for 32 per cent of GDP:2 this is due to the
proportion of GDP accounted for by the
agricultural sector, which in some cases is over
20 per cent (World Bank 2010).3 This explains
why agricultural policy is critical in sub-Saharan
Africa. Despite this, average cereal yields across
the continent rose by less than 50 per cent from
1961 to 2010: an increase from 819kg/ha to
1,302kg/ha. This means that sub-Saharan Africa
produces 2,405kg/ha less than the worldwide
average. By contrast, the regional population
grew over the period by a factor of 3.6 (from
235,988,196 to 854,266,626 people (World Bank
2012)). These huge differences highlight the
problems regarding low production of food,
especially non-processed food. Moreover, in
comparison to other areas with similar agro-
climatic conditions, sub-Saharan Africa performs
particularly poorly. This is usually referred to as
the ‘yield gap’: the difference between current
and potential yield obtainable ‘if appropriate
practices, inputs, technologies and knowledge
were applied’ (OECD-FAO 2011). While this
yield gap is greatest – and worsening – between
sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world, the
gap between the developed world and Latin
America and South Asia is also remarkable
(cf Sumberg, forthcoming).
Based on this, politicians of host countries and
international organisations see in agricultural
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foreign investment a unique opportunity to
stimulate labour markets, boost agricultural
production and provide a solution to the world
crisis. They contend that such investment
programmes offer the possibility to meet the
basic needs of the poor and stimulate
development through the adoption of new
technologies and infrastructural development.
Investment projects are sold as offering
attractive development opportunities for young
people. Local people are promised jobs, better
infrastructure, housing and improved access to
markets. One example is Ethiopia where the
government is openly inviting foreign investment
to develop land so that the country can feed
itself.4 Another high-profile case is sugarcane
production by Addax in Sierra Leone where most
of the promises made by politicians and the
company at the beginning of the project remain
unfulfilled. A report by The Oakland Institute
shows that the company sold such agricultural
projects as a development tool for local people,
but only about 200 people are employed and
these as casual labourers, earning around two
dollars a day.5
The success of this policy of encouraging foreign
investment in agriculture can be seen in the
increase in land deals since 2008 (Figure 1). The
2008 food crisis was a major driver for land
acquisition, providing incentives both for
countries with available capital and vulnerable to
food insecurity to invest; and for others, including
the least developed, to attract foreign investors
through the introduction of legal and fiscal
incentives and by minimising political risks.
From an economic perspective, the increase in
foreign agricultural investment through the
reclamation of huge areas of purportedly
underused land might be considered a desirable
market reaction to the excess demand for food
on the one hand, and the creation of employment
in recipient countries, on the other. Rising prices
hold the promise of higher profits which attract
(foreign) investments into LDCs. As property
rights are often poorly defined in LDCs, in
theory investments in agriculture can help in
defining or redefining property rights.6 Property
rights are necessary in order that large-scale food
production can deliver its promise of securing
nourishment for a growing world population. The
idea is that property rights are defined and
officially registered through non-central market
interactions between the sellers (lessors) and
buyers (leasers) of the land. In economic theory,
clearly defined, enforceable property rights
provide the essential incentive for investment
(since without clear rights to the crop produced,
nobody would be willing to cultivate the land),
which in turn contributes to local development
through the creation of new job opportunities.
Thus, investments in agriculture appear to offer
attractive development opportunities for LDCs
in terms of infrastructure (and associated job
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Figure 1 The global pace of land acquisitions 
Source Prepared by the authors, based on data by Anseeuw et al. (2012).
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creation), technology and knowledge. If these
developments result in higher production and
productivity, they could increase overall food
security. Ideally, investors would reclaim fallow
or underused land which would not affect the
local population directly, but would be beneficial
through the creation of better infrastructure and
new jobs. This win–win situation would improve
the position of all involved parties.7 From a
macroeconomic viewpoint, agricultural projects
can be seen as instruments to introduce young
people into the agricultural sector, raising their
expectations, minimising risks of failure and
creating incentives to stimulate this critical
economic sector. This could also contribute to
controlling the exodus from rural to urban areas
and to mitigating existing negative externalities
of the rapid population growth of LDCs. 
However, there are diverse and serious problems
linked to much of the foreign investment in
agriculture. Investors appear to be being given not
only fallowed land, but also land under cultivation
by local smallholders.8 Depending on the tract
under negotiation, land has at least two important
connotations: its productive aspect – whether it is
located on a floodplain, close to water supplies,
and with a higher soil quality – and the broader
meaning to local land users. In most cases land,
which passes from generation to generation,
represents a critical element of the economic base
for entire families, even if it is apparently
underutilised.9 The areas most attractive for the
state and investors to implement investment
projects tend to be those needing less reclamation
than other areas.
Moreover, in the process of gaining access to land
for cultivation, local communities are often
displaced (Cotula 2010: 56). These resettlements
may be accompanied by human rights violations
– that is, the right to property – against
vulnerable individuals, who inevitably become
worse off (WDR 2012). Such displacements not
only affect the social and productive structure of
local communities but also play an important
role in framing the expectations of young local
people as the current or next generation of
producers. However, resistance to external
investments tends to be weak because young
people do not generally have effective bargaining
power within their communities, since power is
concentrated in a determined gerontocratic elite
or hierarchy (te Lintelo, this IDS Bulletin). In
addition, the political promises of job creation
are in most cases unfulfilled. This raises the
question of whether such investment contracts
can be expected to meet the needs of the local
population through the creation of employment.
3 Public choice approach
The use of public choice theory allows us to apply
a methodological approach to understanding the
interests of politicians in deciding whether or not
to promote large-scale investments. Public choice
is commonly defined as the analysis of non-
market decision-making. It is an interdisciplinary
field that applies economic methodology to the
study of politics: a fairly underdeveloped
discipline until Buchanan’s contribution to the
understanding of how governments work and
how they deal with the implementation of
policies (Mercuro and Medema 2006; Mueller
2008). The complexity of the two systems is a
significant issue in attempts to combine public
choice and legal theories (Farber and Frickey
1991). The application of public choice theory to
law involves examining the critical legal points
in the decision-making process, and using
economics to explain these points (ibid.). Public
choice theory has the capacity to shed light on
the processes of political decision-making, to
understand and evaluate their outcomes, and
ultimately propose how to make them more
transparent. It also provides the possibility of
applying an holistic analysis to the negotiation
process, whereby multidimensional perspectives
allow us to incorporate analytical elements that
would not otherwise be possible to include. 
Following public choice theory, if politicians are
considered to be rational beings10 then
institutions should be structured with this in
mind. Public choice’s assumption of democracy
increases its relevance to sub-Saharan Africa due
to the increase in elections in 2011 (OECD-FAO
2011). Of course, this does not suggest that
problems will be solved; rather it signals
incremental improvements in democratic
participation and institutional modernisation.
The rationality of politicians is based on the
notion that individual preferences are maximised
in the long run, over and above the preferences of
their constituent voters. This, however, cannot be
achieved without domestic support. As a result,
politicians take into account the desires of
domestic lobby groups, which, acting rationally
are also trying to maximise their own profit. At
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the same time investors, as actors in the
negotiation process, are taken as rational
individuals; they are also included as lobbyists.
This means they enter into contracts only when
convinced they will maximise their own profit.
Thus, parties will always aim to protect their
interests through investment contracts. 
To this framework I add the interest groups
approach, which is assumed in this article as part
of public choice theory (Farber and Frickey 1991).
This approach suggests that public choice models
often treat the legislative process as a
microeconomic system in which ‘actual political
choices are determined by the efforts of
individuals and groups to further their own
interests’ (ibid: 39). Here, I concentrate on a
micro-aspect of the whole body of decision-
making, which is based on competition among
pressure groups for political influence. Both
theoretical approaches offer a solution as to why
and whether states engage in contractual
negotiations. This application of public choice to
investment suggests that what matters is that the
decision, with respect to investment contracts,
satisfies the demands of the predominant lobby
groups in the short term; long-term consequences
are not taken into account.11
The value of the analysis from the public choice
perspective is in recognising institutions as an
element of control of political rationality, meaning
that the process of decision-making is directly
correlated with the presence of institutions that
constrain politicians in the use of power to satisfy
their own needs and the guaranteeing of the
redistribution of goods and services.12 However, in
the absence of appropriate institutions, parties (in
this case decision-makers and investors) can
behave in an opportunistic way without
necessarily violating national law. In these cases
international law may act to safeguard values and
control or correct internal failures. This is the role
of international law in my approach. 
With this as a normative approach, we have to
assume that decision-makers must take into
account their international obligations.13
However, in cases where states are signatories of
international treaties that protect violated values
– that is, workers’ rights – and international law
does not act, international law can be seen to fail;
and these cases occur often. This failure has been
justified in different ways. Putnam (1988) argues
that decisions at domestic and international
levels do not necessarily need to be harmonised –
although this would be preferable. His basic
argument is that states that meet their
international obligations improve their
reputations; however ex post violations cannot be
enforced. Therefore, it is necessary to create a de
facto interaction between national and
international institutions, to avoid opportunistic
behaviour and legal failures. This application of
public choice to investment suggests that
institutions matter (Rodrik et al. 2004). They have
the ability to guarantee positive outcomes and
can increase welfare. I assume that, depending on
the pressure domestic interest groups are able to
exert on government and the level and quality of
participation they have in the decision-making
process, positive outcomes may follow.14
4 Overview to contract investments
Eighty investment contracts were analysed by
the author during the course of this research.
Although more would clearly have been
preferable, constraints on access – for instance,
for confidentiality reasons – made this
impossible. These cases, combined with detailed
work by other researchers, form the basis of the
analysis.15 The data refers to four countries:
Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. 
The first generally observed characteristic in the
contracts is that they are vague and imprecise.
Different characteristics are found in each
contract, but I have taken into account only those
elements that could potentially guarantee the
protection and promotion of jobs and thus their
contribution to local development. In terms of the
size of projects, the range is vast: from 431 to
400,000 hectares. Equally, the subjects of the
contracts are very broad, covering the production
of non-processed foods, biofuels, extraction of raw
materials, livestock production, as well as
development of the tourism sector. From what
can be observed in the contracts, only food
production is covered: further processing is not
included. In almost every case, the investors are
registered companies in the host country but
financed by parent companies abroad. The
analysed contracts were signed between October
2010 and February 2011, and are all publicly
available (Table 1). 
The findings indicate that 87.5 per cent of the
contracts analysed do not include specific
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regulations guaranteeing environment and
human rights protection for the local
population.16 The implication, I argue, is that
politicians assume that implementation of the
projects will not affect the lives of local people
and that the investments per se will generate
employment. Using the information provided in
the contracts, it appears that food production is
the principal rationale of the investments.
Regarding the destination of the production,
anecdotal evidence suggests that investors are
export-oriented (The Economist 2011). In addition,
I found no evidence of investors discussing the
consequences of investments with local
stakeholders. Furthermore, the absence of
monitoring, renegotiation, flexibility (with the
exemption of force majeure) and exit mechanisms
is common to all contracts. 
With these observations stated, it is important to
point out some potential limitations to the
research: 
1 The research covers a tiny proportion of total
contracts so this sample cannot necessarily be
considered a true reflection of all large-scale
investment;17
2 Contractual negotiations cannot be directly
compared because they are generally made in
secret; nevertheless, I aimed at maximising
the sample of contracts to obtain a picture of
the presence or absence of social clauses; 
3 Even when contracts were acquired, the
nature of the research made it impossible to
corroborate the actual presence of investors in
the region. This is a limitation, since reports
of international organisations assert that
about 70 per cent of contracted land remains
fallow (Cotula 2010). As a result, I do not
consider whether such deals have been
annulled or cancelled or not yet started, given
that the contracts do not specify a date upon
which work should begin; 
4 This article focuses on analysis of the
inclusion of social clauses in such contracts as
a possible solution to negative externalities
stemming from them. Even in these cases,
from a legal point of view, weak contracts can
prevent the legal system from holding
investors to account. Conversely, even well-
negotiated contracts may be poorly
implemented and produce disappointing
results (Cotula 2011).
5 Can FAI stimulate the local job market?
In order to evaluate this question using public
choice theory, I focus on the rationality of the
parties on the one hand and on the bargaining
power of potentially affected people on the other.
If all players were considered rational and in a
similar position of power, then contracts would
not look as they do: in reality they are unbalanced
– investor-oriented – and do not provide
mechanisms guaranteeing the delivery of ex ante
promises. These aspects allow us to deduce that
not all parties have the same bargaining power in
negotiation of contracts – at least as rational
actors. While it has been consistently highlighted
that communities are ignored in decision-making
processes, we can observe (following te Lintelo,
this IDS Bulletin) that even if communities’
interests are taken into account, young people –
who are the most affected as discussed above – do
not have voice due to the gerontocratic structure
of their local communities. The question arises as
to how contracts should be designed to guarantee
promotion of local development, especially for
young people. The second question is why
politicians behave as they do.
Rational investors cannot be seen as
development promoters, they are simply
investors and their goal is to maximise profits
(see Häberli, forthcoming). This is the essence of
being an investor. This also means that investors
will always go for the most efficient way to
produce in order to maximise their profits. Major
advantages of investing in sub-Saharan Africa
can be seen as the low costs of labour and land,
and weak institutions. However, institutional
weakness has inherent contradictions since it
increases political risks (i.e. of future
expropriations). Investors need to be
compensated for political risk, that is, through
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Table 1 FAI contracts signed, October 2010–February 2011:
selected SSA countries
Countries Size (ha) No of contracts
Ethiopia 338,097 20
Mali 147,400 5
Sierra Leone 48,516 3
Mozambique 975,010 52
Total 1,509,023 80
Source Prepared by the author.
attractive tax preferences and free transfer of
capital, otherwise they would not invest, and this
takes the form of realising low production and
labour costs. As a consequence, regulation is
needed to ensure positive outcomes for recipient
communities. However, this was ignored in the
vast majority of contracts analysed. This
omission causes opportunistic behaviour.18
Institutions play a decisive role in controlling the
rationality of politicians. Well-designed institutions
could potentially circumvent the situation where
politicians, investors and individuals act
opportunistically. Institutions in this case could
prevent huge disparities in information and create
incentives to behave differently. However, since
legal institutions are generally lacking, or are
weak, then providing improved contracts and
information will produce negligible improvements
in outcomes, at least in the short term. This
argument is advanced to explain why policies,
which are sold as ‘well-intentioned’, produce
contrary effects. The worst part of the story is that
even when contracts are signed under these
conditions, they are completely legal at the
national level. However, this is not the case at
international level. Nevertheless, international law
does not offer easy mechanisms for access by
affected local populations. 
These factors highlight the need for integrating
regulations to protect and recognise the right to
work, thus obliging foreign and national large-
scale investors to integrate local populations –
especially young people – into their programmes
and guarantee their improved wellbeing.
Furthermore, states as members of the
International Labour Organization are obliged to
respect and promote workers’ rights as expressed
in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work (ILO 1998), meaning that the
absence of workers’ protection in such contracts
(given the risks associated with the violation of
workers’ rights through the implementation of
such investment programmes) suggests that
states are flagrant violators of (1) the norms of
the International Labour Organization and
(2) the human right to work.
Apart from violating international treaties,
countries involved are annulling the possibility of
any kind of meaningful local development and
may produce social outcomes that generate
detrimental effects for communities, such as
increased food insecurity (see Shepard (2011);
Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen (2010); and
Nelson et al. (2010)). Policies are needed which
support and stimulate agriculture-based local
industry which, as discussed above, is the most
important economic sector for the poor, being a
major component of balanced, just development
(Pinstrup-Andersen and Watson 2011).
A further problem is ‘worker import’, occurring
because firms based in other developing countries
bring in their own workers and ignore the local
workforce, avoiding the need for investment in
education and training in know-how. ‘Worker
import’ also enables firms to charge low end-
product prices on the one side. On the other side
it does reduce employment opportunities for local
people and consequently it leads to a migration
effect in which people may have to migrate to
other regions promising better conditions
(Oleschak 2009). I argue that this can be
construed as a form of social dumping whereby
firms import the low costs rather than migrating
to where costs are low. The non-inclusion of
clauses guaranteeing the inclusion of local people
results in a lack of market access for local
producers and consumers, despite the fact that
many investors promise such access. I argue that
these promises are, a priori, empty. 
Having made a rational evaluation of agricultural
foreign investments, I cannot support the idea
that this policy, as currently implemented, can
ameliorate the latent problems of unemployment
and underemployment, without creating social
distortions. At the same time, the legality of such
contracts cannot be rejected, given the
institutional framework of host countries. 
6 Conclusions
This article has sought to evaluate whether new
agricultural policies based on the introduction of
large-scale investments can alleviate the problem
of employment especially of young people, one of
the most vulnerable groups in sub-Saharan
Africa. There is an urgent need to address the
land issue, given the rapid proliferation of land
investments, regional market conditions, the
demographic situation and criticisms of land
grabs promulgated by sections of the media and
civil society in recent years. In this final section I
highlight the most important considerations, at
least in theory, for future international policy
design.
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Given the depressed status of regional labour
markets, policies oriented towards improving the
local economic situation and satisfying basic
needs are urgently required. Thus, the
introduction of large-scale investments in
agriculture cannot be rejected as a strategy
outright. A strong justification for the inclusion of
these projects in national policy frameworks is
that it would not be possible for recipient
countries to attract firms for small-scale
investments, due to the political risks of engaging
in such countries. The investors who are able to
take on this risk are large-scale investors.
Where the introduction of policies supporting
large-scale investment has been a sovereign
decision made by host countries, we need to
evaluate how such policies should be
harmoniously introduced to address the social
problems affecting local communities. It has
been shown theoretically and empirically that
approaches used to introduce such policies are
often unacceptable and unsustainable. Chinsinga
and Chasukwa (this IDS Bulletin) provide an
empirical study demonstrating the frustration of
affected young people due to non-compliance of
investors in delivering promised benefits;
associated with uncompensated expropriations,
distortion of social structures and inability to
guarantee secure employment. Below I identify
factors which need to be taken into account if
such effects are to be reversed. 
Institutional arrangements play a central role at
both the national and international level. In
recognition that host countries may not be able to
introduce new policies correctly, the international
legal order may be applied to correct national
failure and promote local welfare. International
law offers two different institutional mechanisms
that are able to protect the rights of affected
people, states and investors: human rights and
investment jurisdictions.
At the national level contracting parties need to
create effective institutions and effective
contracts. If parties are considered as rational, it
is necessary to promote participation in
institutional design and also in contractual
design: the nerve point where national
institutions frequently fail. Thus, international
law may play a role in making it possible for
young local people to be part of the discussion
and have an effective voice in decision-making
processes. Given the problems discussed above
associated with weak institutions, namely their
inability to counterbalance politicians’ individual
rational decision-making, there is an urgent need
for some form of regulation to guarantee the
welfare of local people. It is vital that national
and international mechanisms are activated to
avert increases in poverty levels, food insecurity,
damage to social and cultural structures, and to
stimulate the creation of employment in
productive sectors. 
The inclusion of social clauses adopted in this
theoretical approach is just one example of how
contracting parties would benefit from the
introduction of legal guaranties in contractual
arrangements. However, as discussed, affected or
potentially affected people must take part in such
negotiating processes. To achieve the inclusion of
such clauses, states first need to create an
obligation for investors to integrate local
populations into large-scale investment projects
and recognise them as formal workers. They need
to stipulate decent salaries within the prevailing
national context and implement these through
renegotiation and monitoring mechanisms
(which could be implemented by NGOs or
independent organisations), and explicitly
recognise ILO standards and relevant norms (i.e.
Safety and Health in Agriculture Convention
(No 184)). The role of local organisations in
promoting involvement of local people is a very
important factor in creating a direct connection
between international and local actors. It is
questionable, however, how such initiatives could
really work in societies dominated by powerful
elites. Even when large-scale contracts include
initiatives to promote development or positively
engage local populations, even well-intentioned
investors are unable to achieve this without
creating negative externalities, unless
institutions at the national level can provide
balance. 
The contracts analysed demonstrate that it is not
possible from a rational theory viewpoint that
they produce the desirable effects. Looking at
clauses with potential for creation of new and
decent jobs, I suggest that the inclusion of labour
protection can stimulate depressed rural
economies and serve as an incentive for young
people to stay in rural areas and contribute to
personal and economic development for a
determinate life period. Such clauses could also
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bring together groups and interests to create
incentives in agricultural areas, as well as serving
to minimise risks to young people engaging in
exploitative or less favourable employment. The
adoption of effective labour regulations can also
produce a collective internalisation of the
negative aspects of such investment projects. In
doing so, investment projects could realise in
practice the policy recommendations provided by
the ILO to alleviate unemployment and
underemployment in the least developed
countries. 
This article is intended as an academic
contribution to discussions on the phenomenon
of large-scale investment and its impact on rural
unemployment, which mainly affects young
people. More empirical research into the micro
and macro impacts of large-scale agricultural
investment on local populations, and the particular
situation and interests of young people, their
backgrounds and also their personal and
collective expectations and motivations is
needed. There is also a need to investigate the
creation of mechanisms to connect young people
with international organisations to improve
opportunities for participation in negotiations
and discussion processes. Nonetheless, this
contribution has attempted to show, from a law
and economics perspective, how effective
institutional changes at national and international
levels could contribute to reversing the negative
externalities which exacerbate generational
problems of agricultural investment policies.
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1 This article is based on a co-authored working
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2012, Accra, Ghana.
2 World Bank Data (2010).
3 Percentage of GDP from agriculture represents
the proportion of an economy’s total domestic
output of goods and services which are a result
of value added by the agricultural sector.
4 The prime minister of Ethiopia stated: ‘We
want to develop our land to feed ourselves
rather than admire the beauty of fallow fields
while we starve.’ See Siddharth Varadarajan
(2011). However, members of local and
foreign organisations, who observed how the
projects have been run, stated that such
projects involve human rights violations and
that, given the limited capacities of local
people, it is not possible for them to ‘say’
anything about the deals. They also stated
that promises regarding local development
are being ignored. See WDR (2012).
5 See The Oakland Institute (2011a). 
6 Property rights can be defined as a bundle of
rights to dispose of freely and exclude others
from its use. 
7 World Bank research done by Deininger et al.
(2011: XXXIII) describes the possibilities of
development that such projects offer:
‘Investments can provide benefits through
four channels: (1) supporting social
infrastructure, often through community
development funds using land compensation;
(2) generating employment; (3) providing
access to markets and technology for local
producers; and (4) higher local or national tax
revenue.’
8 This effect is also stated by the World Bank
(ibid.): ‘If investments generated profits, social
impacts depended not only on the magnitude
of benefits, but also on the mix of different
types of benefits. For example, entrepreneurial
and skilled people could gain from jobs created
by an investment, while vulnerable groups or
women lost access to livelihood resources
without being compensated. This illustrates
the importance of clearly addressing
distributional issues upfront.’
9 See Tadele and Ayalew Gella, this IDS Bulletin.
10 This means they try to maximise their pay-
offs and are focused on the possibility of
re-election (Campaign-contribution approach). 
11 I have divided the approach in this way
because if the action ‘engage or don’t engage’
is allocated on the same timeline as the action
‘consider domestic constituents or don’t’, I
note that both decisions are relatively
independent of one another. Nevertheless, I
consider that both decisions have an
important effect on political acceptance and
political stability.
12 In addition to the problem I can see regarding
countries which are active in large-scale
agricultural negotiations (the absence of
efficient institutions on the national level), I
suggest that the situation on the international
level can be seen as little different. If we
consider the participation of countries in
which such anomalies/problems take place, as
members of international organisations and
international treaties, the question about
enforcement remains unanswered. 
13 ILO binding treaties: in 1921 ILO (No 11)
aimed to secure the same right of association
for those engaged in agriculture as for
industrial workers. As well as the extension of
social protection that include: Workmen´s
Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, 1921
(No 12); Sickness Insurance (Agriculture)
Convention, 1927 (No 25); Old-Age Insurance
(Agriculture) Convention, 1933 (No 36);
Invalidity Insurance (Agriculture) Convention,
1933 (No 38); Survivor’s Insurance
(Agriculture) Convention, 1933 (No 40);
Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture)
Convention, 1951 (No 99); Holidays with Pay
(Agriculture) Convention, 1952 (No 101);
Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention,
1969 (No 129) and Recommendation No 133
of 1969; and the Plantations Convention, 1958
(No 110) and Recommendation No 110 of
1958. Most recently, the International Labour
Conference adopted the Safety and Health in
Agriculture Convention, 2001 (No 184).
Source: ILO (2003).
14 An example of this is Madagascar, where the
pressure of the citizenry with regards to a
contentious investment contract led to
important changes. See Rivo et al. (2011).
15 See The Oakland Institute
www.oaklandinstitute.org (accessed 20 August
2012).
16 However, it has been reported elsewhere that
in Mozambique there were more than 2,000
new jobs promised; at the time of reporting,
however, not more than 50 have been created.
See The Economist (2011). 
17 Deininger et al. (2011). International
organisations such as the World Bank point
out that more than 80 million hectares are
affected by land grabbing. However, latest
studies report more than three times that. See
Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. (2011) ,
Anseeuw et al. (2012).
18 Opportunistic behaviour is defined as:
self-interested behaviour that involves some
element of guile, deception, misrepresentation,
or bad faith. In this case it takes the form of
violation of property rights (Williamson 1985).
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